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DOCTRINE OF DIVORCE AT THE TIi1UE OF CHRIST.
Since the beinning cf timo non , hvc sought mar-
riage; and since the bb::ini of time some men have sought
to break up the relation into which they have entered.
As men have attained moral cnlightment they have fel-t
that ,'- a ight cling to the latter procedure, and they have
en, lvcie c c tiiad out where the wrong lay, and have tried to
develop some rules or modes of action by which they might
avoid wrong in breaking up the marriage relation.
Whatever rules or modes of action might be determined
upon, of them, of, course, fraud and pretense would avail
themselves.
But behind the whole body of practice in breaking up
marriage, we may conclude that there lay in consciousness a
moral question. Had this not been the case no rules would
have ever come into existence by which men would be expected
to conform their action in breaking up their marriage rela-
tion.
When Christ came to deal with the mofal affairs of men,
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the question, what was right to do in respect to divorce was
before the mind of the.Jew,is'h p1eople. It had been before
the mind of that people for more than a thousand years. It
was still a vexing question. The solutions proposed had
never been crystallized into a principle that seemed to be
a guide to a universal practice. So men were debating the
question for what causes a man might put away his wife.
The law of Moses was seen to be primarily merely a reg-
ulation of the mode of procedure when a man put away his
wife. But for what causes she should put him away, on that
there was debate.
This questiog vexeta was brought before Jesus Christ.
He took hold of it and 7ave it a treatment that like the rest
of his work in morals, seems to be jork done for all time.
The law of Christ as given to the Pharisees was that
no man should put away his wife except it be for fornication,
Matthew, XIX..
At this time women had very few rights under the Hebrew
laws. The woman might have her husband killed for adultery
so strict were the customs regarding this crime, but that was
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her only remedy. Should she be brutally treated or neglect-
ed, there was no law providing for her relief. These laws
however, allowed the husband to put his wife away if she was
unclean. Here a controversy was raised between the schools
of Sharnmai and Hillel.- The latter claiming that the term
unclean applied to any offensive act or that it should be
used in its ethical sense while the formcr claimed that it
applied to irmoral acts as adultery.
A man dismissing his wife was obliged to give her a
formal writing showing the rea on for sending her away.
This is about all the procedure necessary then. This was
the state of affairs when Christ spoke on the question.
Christ was not a civil legislator, but a supreme moral teach-
er. lie did not establish laws of divorce but rather do-
elared that the existing code permitted many things which vio-
lated high ethical rules, and that the freedom then allowed
was entirely inconsistent with the true principal conception
of marriage. Thereby Christ by a few words on this subject
turned legislation and usage into a new chaz::el.
A4
'IT. P!T:"-.,. 17 IH]; OF DiVCCI&,.
T.ih iu: a lTny boo}k an6 you ,ill find divorcc treat-
ed under two heads.
1. Divorce a vinculo :iatrir-nii; or divorce from the
bond of i arria., ;icd,
-. .. ..... r -- t a frI table &ord
be; cr as we usualy ,ay, fr ,,o,!- '(2,
The subject of a.Ulty i. well be discus:d here,
but in this treatise ,ae will be tnablo to give it proper
at tcnt i on.
These definitions pretty clearly convoy an idea of the
extent and the liritations of the :kind of divorce to wh ich
thei are severally aplied. The u~ie:t expression of
the dlistinction setween the two is that of Blackstonc, who
says, " One is total, the other partial."
Divorc, !'ro- thie bond of ratrinory is a tottdl sevorance
of that bond, and usually places oth : ~atics, so far as the
law is cnoe2~c:, in the esnc attitude toward each other, and
toward every person else, as though they never had been
married.
This kind of divorce haa existed under some form, and
with varying regulations, by the authority of the government
of almost every nation of ma-nkind. t ha. its standing in
the Jewish law, Greek, and Romain la-w. It h1ad its standing
in the civil law- that is7 in ±ha:t body of secular law which
grew up about the later Roman E mpire and it- succossorsa in
Europe. The power to sunde-r the bond of rvtrimony for
various and varying causes stancds in the statute law of many
of the modern nations of the continent of Europe. It
stands in the statutes og Great Britain, and in the statutes
of most, if not all, of t S, tates of the Ancrican Union.
Divorce is not known in the oinmon law of this country,
Properly speaking it was not known to the cormn-on law of Eng-
land, but only to ecclesiastical law. Vie shall have occasion
further on to discuss the drift of legislation upon divorce
from the bonds of riatriraony.
Divorce . - . t thora, is only -)artial sverance of
the marriage bond. It separates the parties from each
other, so far as to cmuad c:.oh tc the libctvJ of 'is and her
-5-
o ,vn ...... > -I co trol unfl ,_Lh'eu ,,', c, otreer. '.1her is an
evidernt forelooking in such .... of divorce .c i. rocctcilia-
tion .id rounio: cf -the -1t 1,.e....., Vol.
VXXV , :e.e -
Di~ore a -rs tt* ro ,,e : ' ii- tlnu Chrch,- h
7Ct Ch.rc,-- as itt C rcl Cii: of t.e cifficultie, of the
ma: i o sitution. It hcT bdc,- the .ractice of the Cath-
oi Church to allo 7o diorce ": the 'co- of matrimony.
It rust all the evils of the u -i5.to by wat', a meant
to a disci-)inary o-vi fr- "hi, e-- a bo ard,
unc!(e, such roc rictiou~ .s its authoritios doc"e, d ':Tisc to
Thr r' ) 12111( c the'-' ohv -iao de c-f' va-
r: rtv of --e. l t. . o- ... ._ other 0r-m tt-s' " 'e.i.. -h, o"f
divorce This c- f la:s and boo's: of - letiOns is
know;,__ as thie oanon law
'Thn ;rto hcae Crist.ins IEay of t1,cn recognized
this canion law, and turned over to the church courts the sub-
jects which it covere This was the case in lnind,
7T'ere for centuries .... r - a t - _'_lrc .. ont to
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ecclesiastic,. courts, and .';. J:Lb_ ite ... 3por.'ins to cal-
on law. -ut until the yet:l 187, writ right Lo callcd the
co.m.on l ' ,, of riorcc v-, ca -; lay;-- the out-
growth of the ro-1ilations of the church. Tilil that year in
that coiz.try divo-rces for adltery even could be only from
bed and board.
'~ he ~cisiuticJ.coaits 7-omr not d'l in this
Sou ntry. Div(o.. has i.c 1t_,.- hore ,-t by statute.
Prob ably all of tic s tAtes :rov y o7 tstLutcs o:' th(u subject of
divorce. In very !.iany, provisions are na.c for divorce
f-rom bd. and board. in some of the states the statutes are
so construedid, that it is at the option of a party, for any
... .e a vicl -he
cause, to bring . "ill for divorcc, eithx a vinculo or a
mensa.
There is great need of a better understaning of the
philosophy and use of divorc,:, a onv'nsa. It has little stand-
ing in the la v and in the social practice of the people of
this nation that miry of the States L.ve no statuto permitting
and regulfating it, and oone :r.vc rece.tly cpeale tatutes
authorizing it.
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Certainly it is easy to conceivu of L case in which a wife
Tnight desire to be freed from the control of a drunhen hus-
band. Uho yet rni~-ht AconJ_tous ov (ven have sentimental
scruples about total disruption of the marriage bond. Such
a woman ought not to be oy the statute law of the Stat.e,
up t6 the alternative of procuring a divorce from the bonds
of marriage, or of a iring her miseries -aithout halrp from
society. Even if a large percentage of applications for
divorce are for divorce a vinculo, that is no reason why the
State should not -rovidc for divorce a mensa for tI.o e who
desire it. These arc most likely to be of conscientioua
nature. Is the State to adapt its laws to the wishes of
the most lawless-- those who ill push their advantages under
the lawo, to the _euatcst extreme?
Caxon, Todd, in his article in the Contemporary Review,
well maintains the ground that the law.s ought to correspond
to the convictions of the that those who have relig-
ious scruples ought not to com gulled to'violate those scruples
in order to obtain aid from the !a,.
Take now, for cxan1le, any state where there are no
provisions for d.vorce a mensa. It has riany of tho Catholic
faith among its citizens. The Catholic Church p-actically,
from time imemorial, has allowed to her adherents divorce a
mensa, and has resolutely prohibited., and d"oes still prohibit
divorco a vinculo. Yet this State provides only for
divorce a vinculo by the statutes. Its statute. law is a
stand.ing! insult and practical injury to all citizens of
Catholic faith.
P2-otestantism is working its Vray into something like
'unity with the Catholic Church on the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. Any State in compelling all divorces to be
a vinculo, is as offensive to the thoughtful and conscientous
Protestant as to scrupulous Catholic. When the greater
measure of' relief offered 'y the state for the ills of mar-
riage is a violation of the princit2.es of the most religious
of its citizens, it certainly ought to allow the less measure
which they might desire. To allow divorce a mensa is defen-
sible every way.
The government is in various ways constantly exercising,
incidentally the principle of divorce a nensa- sometimes
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upon the motion of one of the pt:-ei in r:iagO some-
times upon its own motion iii spite of? the :)rotest,: of both
parties.
If a rai breahs the peace by co- ittinr assault and bat-
tory T'onothor the State taP o fim from th~ bo.-o-, of his
fanil' a d incarccrate- him Ii- the Cownon jail. That is a
so-ar:tion from bed a:md board of the :u ban. and viife.
If a mTnu commit an assault, deadly in its nature, upon
the person of his wifc, the St -te -,,y :on ct her instigation,
or _-s.oinSt her co-nsent, interfere . brea up the control h e
may have over hi'r person by imprisoning him for a long term
of years. In the exercise of this right the stat. doos
not intorfer, v:ith the marriage bond.
Sufficient basis for &ivcrcc a mensa may be f una in
this police pover. Society may provide f.r its owrn peace,
anr in doi so it ::.ay incor orute into its stat utes, the
principle of" divorce, -1cn-s one -cn of sedurin: that
peace.
It must be aditted that divorcc z Lo.- a is not in the
standing with the lawyers. You find nw a.d then a
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statement of a Court or a judge in some forner gencration
that trails its way without question dovrn through all the
law books.
Well toward a hundred years ago Lord Stowell, said that
divo > -a >a ift the parties " in the undefined and dan-
gerous character of a wife without a husband, and a husband
without a wife". In arguments against the principles of
divorce a rionsa in the law books that is still quoted as
supreme wisdom. Now, that a hundred Fears ago the brutal
class in English society, low and high, wet sufficiently
numerous to create a kind of public sentiment that a woman
who was not under the special protection of some aa was law-
ful plunder for whoever could -cssess hir.isclf of her, is not
to be denied. It is not to be denied that divorce a mensa
to the brutal instinct did reduce a wman to the condition
of a candidate for its game. But it is suggested that
there is no further necessity of preserving Lord Stowell's
remark in modern law treatises.
Bishop, in his treatise on divorco, which is so really
valuable as to hold the field against all others, hesitates
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not to reveal, evon spitefully, his antagonism to the prin-
ciple if divorce a ric:-ia. -u dcsign ... es it as ill-be-
gotten monster made up of )ioU.s doctrine and worldly stupid-
ity", With statements cast in that form there is not much
chance to argue.
One can only reply that the moral force which lies
behind the demand for divorce a mensa is really piety, and
that the intellectual conccption is founded not on stupidity,
but clearness of vision.
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DIFFICULTIES IN DIVORCE.
On the subjects for which a divorce can be granted
the statutes rango from no divorce a vinculo not even in case
of adultery, to divorce at the discretion of the court or for
genial infelicity. When you attempt to gather up the general
drift of legislation you will find it will rin something as
follows::
Statutory grounds for divorce:
Adultery, Impotency, Imprisonment for crime, desertion,
Neglect to make suitable provision, Cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, J.habitual drunkenness, Discretion of the Court.
Some of these grounds do not appear in some statutes.
In some, other grounds are added. The way of expressing the
same cause is quite various. But theXe are the main items
that find their way into the elementary law treatises for
comment.
Here we find ourselves in a predicament for when you
begin to make a list of causes for divorce, you cannot end.
You can think of other causes that are as rational grounds
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fo7r divorce as these. Mr. Bishop says that when you go be-
yond a list of causos something lihe the above, you come to
" ground uncertain, shadowy". Now chronic hatred or jealousy
is not "shadowy" matter in marriage. it is easy enough to
conceive of a keenness of hate on the part of a husband that
,oulc be far moro intolerable than a maudlin good n-ature that
S .. o a itual drune s. Yet by the statutes
of co.e sta-tcs a iivorc' fi-ht be .,oourd for t"c -'.1c,
noss, b'-, it .,ould 'be i rvossible to'obt'I. a livorce for
hate.
One party could be accohnmodated with a divorce for a
lcss evil; while another would be held fast to a more bitter
fate. There is no rational stopping place when you once
start. You cannot specify a list of causes but human expor-
ience will bring up something outside your list that will
appeal for relief to the sense of justice with more power
than many a case that will fall within the list. And it
will be no out-of-the-way-, unheard-of trouble either, but
something that occurs, or may occur, frequently in human life.
Marriage is one of the greatest of human institutions. No
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other has a broader reach over the scale of human experience.
It is hardly possible to do anything like substantial justice
to the evils that may occur in married life, by specifying in
the rough, half a dozen causes for which a divorce may be
allowed, while the gates are shut on all the rest.
It is only coarse, crude work that the statutes are ablo
to do. But the keenest misery may not lie along the rough
lines indicated by the statute, as the subtile state of the
affections and moods of disposition cannot find statutory
expressions.
As the statute~of the numerous states are in such a con-
fused condition4,the dccisicns of the courts, which construe
these statutes a e worse confounded. It is no objection to
the wisdom of these courts that decisions have oen reirdered
contradicting each other in all manner of ways. The diffi-
culty is one inherent in the nature of the case. Suppose
the business submitted to the court is to define cruelty or
drunkennss, or desertion, or any other statutory cause for
divorce, to say what degree of them, or either of them, shall
constitute ground for diviorce, and what shall not. It is to
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be soon at oncte, that the court is sot to solve a problcm with
perpetually varying elements.
Take cruelty for instance, 12r.ishop says," Of those
things in the law which require definitions there is no one
more difficult to define than logal cruelty." Generally it
may be stated that at one tic or another in the attempt t,
define cruelty every concoivablo case has been decided in
every conceivable manner. Distinction has been made where
there is no difference. It has been decided that to slap a
wife's face is not cruelty, and it has been decided that to
throw a )ail of water on her is. It has bcc decided that
to wring a wife's nose is not cruelty, and it has been decided
that to spit tin her face is.
There is no need of bringing up other examples of the
conflict of opinion over other statutory causes of divorce.
We can see that the swne difficulties must beset the attempt
to define what druxikeCnness is, or desertion.
For the variety of decisions that can to found on this
subject, as has been slaid, much accounts must be given to the
temper of the judge. What is cruelty or drunkenness as
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cause for a divorce with one judge would not be with another.
Men differ so Tmuch in temnerment and pirceCtlon. If then
we attempt to specify by statute causes for which divorce a
vinculo should be 7ranted, we fin' that we are all at sea as
to the limits within those causes inside which such divorce
should be allowed.
We have the double difficulty boefore us of deciding
what ar the causes and then of defining limits within those
causes.
-1-
THE LAW AS IT EXISTS IN THE UNITED STATES
We propose in the present article to give some ac-
count of the state of divorce in our own country. This is
indeed a very difficult task in many ways as in this broad
field the materials are either to many or to few, or lie out-
side of our appropriate province.
The law of divorce must be gathered from the statutes
of a great many independent law making bodies, v7hich are cer-
tainly continually changing their legislation, so that sup-
plement after supplement would have to be consulted to find
the latest wisdom of the representatives of the people. Be-
sides this we might look at the procedure of the courts al-
though it belongs chiefly to the lawyers, and is of use to us
in our investigation only so far as it affects the facility
of obtaining divorce.
The first point to which we call attention, is the di-
vorce laws of the several states of the union. Here to
avoid endless repetition we shall endeavor to bring the nec-
essary details under a few heads.
No such details are furnished us except the scanty ones
in the notes of Chancellor Kent's 27th.lecture, (Vol 11.95-128)
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Mr.Bishop, in his standard work on marriage and divorce
(4 Ed. 183C), declines Xotting out in extenso the statute
laws of our several states relating to civorce. Should this
be done "says he.:, a great number of our pages would be occu-
pied with work, wbile very little benefit indeed would result
to the reader. " But is observable" he continues, " that the
statutory law of this country, relating to this subject, seems
in general to have been drawn up by men who either did not
possess much knowledge of the unwritten law which governs it ,
or did not regard such unwritten law as worthy to be consid-
ered by them in framing the statutes; and who, moreover, gave
but little thought to the matter of the practical working of
the statutes. The interpretation of these enactments,
therefore, becomes a subject of great difficlilty.
Coming now to the laws of the several ctates we shall
find that in some of the oldest ones their origin, has had an
important influence on legislation down to the present time.
The Puritans brought the English law with them, but separated
from it in the matter of divorce, by following, as they sup-
pose, the rules of the New Testament. Adultery and desertion
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were then the only causes for divorce, and from this begin-
ning their legislation following the analogy between deser-
tion and certain other kindred offenses, degenerated until it
lost sight of the New Testament, entirely. Other colonies
adhered more nearly to the English law, or, as Maryland, many
have been influenced by the Roman Catholic doctrine of marP
riage and so confined divorce within narrower limits. Louis-
iana has been subject to varying forces in the transition
from a dependency of France and Spain to the complete Amer-
ican character. In the newer states various concurrent in-
fluences may have shaped the divorce laws, such as the views
of some prominent man among the earlier settlers, and the
origin, foreign or domestic, of large classes of their inha-b-
itants. At first divorces were mainly granted by an act of
a colonial legislature in accordance with the practice exist-
ing in England.
In the laws of Massachusetts published in 1690, the only
provision we find in relation to divorce, is that all contro-
versies concerning marriage and divorce shall be heard and
determined by the Governor and Council.
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Kent states in regard to more recent timcs, that the
constitutions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi allowed di-
vorce only by two-thirds vote of each branch of the legisla-
ture after trial and verdict of a superior court, r a court
of Chancery. But later constitutions have, in all these
states, rendered such actions of the law making body unnecess-
ary, if not forbidden its exercise altogether. Kent adds
that in Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, the legisla-
ture and not the courts had power to decree divorce. In
Connecticut and New York, where the courts had jurisdiction,
it was not exclusive, that the legislature of these states
occasionaly made tse of this power. In 1836, divorce a vin-
culo were granted by the legislature of Illinois, without any
course assigned, and in 1837, by that of 1issouri. But the
evils and the questionable tight of such special legislation
haVe in a great measure put an and .to it.
Such legislation is now prohibited by the constitutions
of at least thirty or forty of the states, among the rest by
that of New York framed in 1846; and almost all the recent
constitutions contain similar restrictions.
The States of the Union, if looked at with reference to
their divorce laws, may be divided into those which provide
both for absolute divorce and for separation from bed and
board, and those which know nothing abcull the last mentioned
procedure.
After examining the statutes of the States, you will
find that about one-half authorize absolute and qualified
divorce. In some States separation from bed and board may
be pronounced by decree of a court temporary or perpetual,
and may be revoked by a formal decree or judicial act; al-
though it is usually confined to certain crimes, such as
cruelty, or drunkenness, or nglect to maintain the wife.
In other States, such as Rhode Island and Kentucky, it
can be granted for any crime which is a cause of a divorce
a vinculo, if the parties desire it, and the court think fit.
It may, also, be followed in some States by divorce a vinculo
if the parties are not reconciled within a certain period as
five or ten years.
We now pass to the laws of the great majority of the
States, and leadinF characteristis Of which are to grant
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divorce, or it may be separation, for a great variety of
offences, to take no account of religious considerations, and
thus to aim at renoving difficulties which arise between partk
in marriage.
These laws of t1p present time furthermore do not fairly
reproaent the original plan of the colonial legislation.
The older States in the course of timo have fallen far below
the strictness of their ancient lws, and the new ones have
started from the lower position on a downward path.
It was natural for Maryland at first to be under the
influence of the Catholic doctrineand for Virginia to follow
the model of England. The Puritan colonies began their leg-
islation with two causes for divorce, adultery, and desertion,
holding that the New Testament recognized both of these as
sufficient grounds for divorce. Such was the early legis-
lation, which continued substantially unaltered until after
the revolution shook aid broke off the old traditions, and a
new development of society began.
When now marriage began to be looked upon more and more
as a mere contract, when religious and moral considerations
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were kept apart from political, when legislation, perhaps in
inexperienced hands, set about removing palpable evils with-
out looking at remote consequences, when cities with their
vices and their population grew in size and number, when em-
igration from the eastern States gave up its lands and homes
to an inferior class of society, and in the west many of the
foreign settlers were trained up under loose laws of divorce-
when such causes as these were actingit is not strange tha
laxer principles touching the sanctity of marriage crept in
and expressed themselves i; legislation. But aside from
these social causes of c7ange in the laws, some argue tha it
was a kind of logical necessity for a broder system of di-
vorce.
If desertion was a good groung. for divorce it might be
asked why should no; neglect to provide for a wife be such
also, which is akind of desertion, or imprisonmcnt which is
an enforced desertion. There( are ot!er actions which lie at
the border of these, why should not they be good grounds for
divorce if the sufferer desires it. And so, for ought we
know by and by, it may be argued that as the essence of the
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marriage, considered in its spirit of love, when this ceases,
there is no good reason why marriage should not cease at the
pleasure of the parties. Thus we come to the Roman method,
to the conception of marriage as a mere contract, Lnd to the
principle that incopatibility of temper or a new p.assion may
legitimately put an end to what even the Romal lawyers called
the individua vitae consuetudo.
It would be a dreary and profitless task if we were able
o undertake it, to give an abstract of the laws relating to
divorce of a large number of the separate states. All that
we shall attempt is, to enumerate the principle causes which
authorize the dis~colution of marriage in rnost of the states.
1. Adultery. This can be followed by divorce .2verwhere, ard
the definition is substantially the same throughout the conn-
try.
2. Desertion. This offece is calid by several names, as
abandonment, however the sense in all the forms of expressiom
is no doubt the same. The length and kind of desertion is
variously defined by the diffe rent states.
3. Irmprisonment for crime, .is absence or forced separation,
caused by the guilt of one of the parties in preventing the
fulfillment of conjugal and family du ties. For t .is :,ason
and perhaps on account of disgrace also most of the states
regard this for divorce or separation.
4. Neglect to Drovide for a wife's maintenance or support.
This lies between cruelty and -7esertion. So it is added in a
number of statutes as a reason for divorce, or for separation
in those codes in which separation is knovmn.
a. In almost all the statutos which we have colsulted cruel-
ty under some lorm of words or otbr is a cause for either
absolute or qualified divorce. Prbably there is no code in
any stato in which this does not :pear. It is described in
such phrases as intolerable severity, ( Vt), extreme cruelty
(Me.), intolerable cruelty ( Conn. ) , cruelty and conduct
rendering co-habitation unsafe for the wife (N.Y.),
Has it not we ask i- closing been made to appear that the
laws of divotce in this c untry demand thorou-h examination,
and in many states at least, a thorough revision. And are
not all rightrainded people called upon to unite in a demand
that there be some check on so great and threatening an evil
as that which we have spoken of in this treatise.
